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Idiotae, Mathematics, and Artisans: The Untutored Mind and the 
Discovery of Nature in the Fabrist Circle 
Richard J. Oosterhoff 
 
 
In his first work, the Dialecticae Institutiones of 1543, Peter Ramus urged those who wanted 
to learn the truth about the world not to approach scholars, but vineyard workers.1 ‘From their 
minds, as from a mirror, an image of nature will be reflected’, he promised.2 Ramus’ dialectic 
reflected the humanist tradition of Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola, dissatisfied with the 
jargon of scholastic logic, searching for a ‘common sense’ way of arguing and speaking that 
could serve real audiences.3 In this tradition, ‘invention’ was not only a means of finding 
material that one could then arrange and deliver for a rhetorical occasion, as Cicero and 
Quintilian prescribed.4 It was also a way of knowing the natural world; to discover the right 
words was to uncover the order of things. 
 One of Ramus’ most penetrating modern readers, Walter Ong, was troubled by this 
dependence on naïve knowledge. The problem was how invention worked: topics, places, or 
arguments seemed to come from nowhere. Why do these topics properly carve up the world? 
In Ong’s view, Ramus did not account for how words tie onto the world, leaving the process 
of invention mysterious.5 Medieval logic textbooks, such as Peter of Spain’s Summulae, had 
                                                 
1 This paper was written during a fellowship at the Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study, 2012-2013. I 
am grateful to Robert Goulding and James Hirstein for their thoughtful comments and corrections. 
2 P. Ramus, Dialecticae institutiones, ad celeberrimam, et illustrissimam Lutetiae Parisiorum Academiam 
(Paris, 1543), 6v. On this passage and Ramus’ belief that mathematics mirrored the real structure of nature 
see R. Goulding, Defending Hypatia: Ramus, Savile, and the Renaissance Rediscovery of Mathematical 
History (New York: Springer, 2010), 21–24.  
3 L. Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Valla’s Humanist Critique of Scholastic Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).  
4 Cicero, Rhetorica ad herennium, 1.2.3; Quintilian, Institutiones oratoriae, 3.3.1. This view of ‘invention’ 
was standard through the middle ages: M. Carruthers, The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the 
Making of Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 10–14.  
5 W. J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason 
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offered rules for finding places along with a theory of predication addressing how words tie 
onto things. Since Ong, some have blamed Rudolph Agricola’s De inventione dialectica for 
imprecision about words, and for importing rhetorical priorities into dialectic. The standard 
narrative moves from Valla and Agricola to Johann Sturm, Philip Melanchthon and Ramus, 
university pioneers of method who brought rhetorical invention to the forefront of a new 
humanist dialectic.6 Walter Ong, Paolo Rossi, and Cesare Vasoli have all identified a basic 
shift in the use of invention during this period, from a rhetorical technique for producing 
conviction, to a mechanism for sifting the truth of things.7 
 Here I focus on a key stage in this shift, in the circle of Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, an 
influential professor of arts at the University of Paris. Ong noticed that Lefèvre’s new printed 
textbooks extended the medieval diagrams and visual aids for logic, a transition toward the 
increased quantification and visualization of logic.8 Picking up on the same visual 
framework, Paolo Rossi noted Lefèvre’s interest in Ramon Lull to supply mnemotechnical 
support to logic.9 Vasoli deepened this point, observing that in his logic books Lefèvre 
followed Lull and Nicholas of Cusa when he used images to extend the medieval tradition of 
visualizing logic in diagrams and tables.10 Neither Ong, Rossi, or Vasoli, however, discussed 
what the ‘mystical’ tradition that interested Lefèvre’s circle had to do with their philosophical 
interests. 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958), 182–183. On Ramus’ failure to provide an experimental 
basis for his method, see 268-269.  
6 For an overview of the literature, see P. Olmos, ‘Sciences, Negotia and Domestic Conversations: Pedro 
Simón Abril’s Conception of Logic in Its Renaissance Context’, Intellectual History Review 22, no. 4 
(2012): 481-497 (481–485). 
7 K. Meerhoff, ‘Agricola et Ramus. Dialectique et rhétorique’, in Rodolphus Agricola Phrisius 1444-1485, 
ed. Fokke Akkerman and A.J. Vanderjagt, Brill’s studies in intellectual history, 6 (Leiden-New York: Brill, 
1988), 273. See also the important paper of T. Heath, ‘Logical Grammar, Grammatical Logic, and 
Humanism in Three German Universities’, Studies in the Renaissance 18 (1971): 9–64.  
8 Ong, Ramus, Method, 74–79.  
9 P. Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory: The Quest for a Universal Language, trans. Stephen Clucas (1983; 
London: Continuum, 2000), 29, 38.  
10 C. Vasoli, La dialettica e la retorica dell’Umanesimo: ‘Invenzione’ e ‘Metodo’ nella cultura del XV e XVI 
secolo (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1968), 187, 201–203.  
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 In this paper I focus on Lefèvre’s circle through the library of Beatus Rhenanus 
(1485-1547), and especially the books he acquired during his studies with Lefèvre between 
1503 and 1507. From marginalia in these books, I delineate the theme of the ‘untutored mind’ 
as the source of invention from nature. Beatus himself, a butcher’s son, never turned to 
artisans for ‘real’ knowledge; instead, he amassed a reputation for his erudition in Latin 
letters. Nevertheless, his library and annotations highlight sources of this theme in the late 
medieval mystical tradition, as I show in the first section. I then turn to invention in Beatus’ 
logical education, focusing on how his teachers explained naïve knowledge and offered 
mathematics as a key example of such knowledge. Finally, I sketch how Beatus’ teachers 
contributed to the growing common culture of artisans and scholars in Paris – that is, the 
context of Ramus and his esteem for unlearned knowledge. 
1. Idiotae in Paris 
The majority of the books that Beatus Rhenanus bought while studying with Lefèvre, Josse 
Clichtove, and Charles de Bovelles still fill the Bibliothèque humaniste de Sélestat, the 
Alsatian town where Beatus was born and died. These books address the whole cycle of the 
liberal arts and philosophy. Moreover, their marginalia witness to what was read at Cardinal 
Lemoine during the height of Lefèvre’s influence on university education. Beatus bought all 
the greatest hits of Paris humanism. His library represents the circle of Robert Gaguin in the 
1470s, the debates over Greek and Latin eloquence between Girolamo Balbi and Guillaume 
de Tardif in the 1480s, and the Europe-wide bestsellers of Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico 
della Mirandola, and Desiderius Erasmus. After gaining the MA in 1507, Beatus studied 
Greek with Johannes Cuno at Basel, working in Johann Froben’s print shop. Later he became 
Froben’s philological consultant, emending manuscripts of Pliny, the Church Fathers, and 
Erasmus himself. But Beatus began his career at the heart of northern humanism in the 
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Collège du Cardinal Lemoine, where he went to study with Lefèvre, already famous for new 
printed university textbooks, chiefly on Aristotle and mathematics. Lefèvre had been taken by 
the growing passion for restored Latin and Greek letters of Florence, but he especially hoped 
to use the early sources of the Church Fathers and the medieval Christian mystics to revitalize 
university culture.11  He advanced this program in printed textbooks as well as through 
training a generation of masters at Cardinal Lemoine, such as Josse Clichtove and Charles de 
Bovelles.12 
 This program of university reform can be excavated from three late medieval authors 
important at Beatus’ collège, who shared the idea that things, not texts, should be the source 
for invention. The first was Ramon Lull, a thirteenth-century Majorcan mystic.13 Beatus 
made his first appearance as author in Lefèvre’s editio princeps of Lull’s Contemplationes 
and Blaquerna (1505), with an epigram on the title page. In this poem, Beatus explained 
Lull’s life as a conversion from illiteracy to grammar; he had lived for thirty years, ‘pompous, 
mad, lazy, and stagnant’, without the benefit of any Latin. When he had finally repaid ‘the 
poisonous crimes of life gone by’, he sought out the basics of the Latin language at Paris, 
grazed on grammar, and left ‘innumerable books infused with the art of naked simplicity’.14 
                                                 
11 For Paris at this time, see A. Renaudet, Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres 
d’Italie, 1494-1517, 2nd ed. ([1916] Paris: Édouard Champion, 1953). Beatus’ studies in Paris are described 
by E. Faye, ‘Beatus Rhenanus lecteur et étudiant de Charles de Bovelles’, Annuaire des Amis de la 
Bibliothèque Humanist de Sélestat (1995): 119–138. The relation of Lefèvre’s program to monastic reform 
is explored in Jean-Marie Legall, Les moines au temps de Lefèvre d’Etaples et Guillaume Briçonnet à 
Saint-Germain-des-Prés’, in Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples (1450?-1536) (Paris: Honoré Champion Éditeur, 
1995), 125-140. 
12 On Clichtove, see J.-P. Massaut, Josse Clichtove, l’humanisme et la réforme du clergé, 2 vols. (Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres, 1968); J. K. Farge, Biographical Register of Paris Doctors of Theology, 1500-1536 (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980), no. 101. For Bovelles, see the biographical material in J.-C. 
Margolin, ed., Lettres et poèmes de Charles de Bovelles (Paris: Champion, 2002); specifically on his role as 
Beatus’ teacher, see E. Faye, “Beatus Rhenanus lecteur et étudiant de Charles de Bovelles,” Annuaire des 
Amis de la Bibliothèque Humanist de Sélestat (1995): 119–138.   
13 J. M. Victor, ‘The Revival of Lullism at Paris, 1499-1516’, Renaissance Quarterly 28, no. 4 (1975): 504–
534; K. Emery, ‘Mysticism and the Coincidence of Opposites in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century 
France’, Journal for the History of Ideas 45, no. 1 (1984): 3–23.  
14 Edited in E.F. Rice, ed. The Prefatory Epistles of Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples and Related Texts (New York: 
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 Even in his Latin works, Ramon Lull assumed the persona of an idiota, someone who 
lacked Latin grammar.15 Lefèvre and his circle were attracted to Lull precisely by the 
simplicity of his language. Lefèvre claimed that when he had first encountered the 
Contemplationes in 1491 he was ‘seized by desire to read it’ (rapior ilico libri legendi 
desiderio). Moved to tears, he nearly entered a monastery.16 Before publishing the 
Contemplationes, however, Lefèvre published a series of dialogues by Lull, in which Lull 
presented himself as an outsider to academic culture. In the Phantasticus, Lull recounted a 
debate between himself as a hermit and a clericus on the road to the Council of Vienna. He 
and the learned man discussed which of them had chosen a lifestyle more detached from 
reality—which of them was the true dreamer or phantasticus. Not surprisingly, they 
concluded that the simple hermit sees the true order of things because he sees them in their 
right relation to the divine. In the introduction to that edition, Lefèvre defended Lull’s humble 
status and awkward Latin: ‘let not anyone be held back because this man was an idiota and 
illiterate, an ordinary inhabitant of the wild waste and vast solitude’. Rather, he had a ‘certain 
infusion from above, by which he far excels the wise men of our age’.17 Lefèvre’s defense of 
Lull’s artless Latin drew on the Apostle Paul, who warned about those who teach false 
knowledge in order to tickle prurient ears, constructing fables in their desire to appear 
                                                                                                                                                        
Columbia University Press, 1972) [hereafter cited as PE], ep. 45. “En pius egreditur latum Raemundus in 
orbem … Iam bene tricenos Raemundus vixerat annos | Pomposus, vecors, desidiosus, iners … Noxia 
praeteritae redimens ubi crimina vitae … Grammaticen libans primum, infus arte reliquit | innumeros nuda 
simplicitate libros.” Beatus’ copy is Bibliothèque humaniste de Sélestat [hereafter BHS] K 1134a.  
15 The common translation of idiota as ‘layman’ is inaccurate; the term laicus was a perfectly good Latin word 
with that meaning. Moreover, the notion of ‘layman’ presumes an opposition between clericus and idiota; a 
common grammar commentary by Synthen (and Hegius) of Deventer, which Beatus owned, clarified that a 
clericus might not know grammar, and so be an idiota, while there were many examples of laici who 
commanded excellent Latin. J. Synthen, Dicta Sinthis super prima parte Alexandri (Strassburg: Martin 
Schott, 1487), sig. a2r. Lull’s lay character is examined by M.D. Johnston, The Evangelical Rhetoric of 
Ramon Llull: Lay Learning and Piety in the Christian West Around 1300 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996).  
16 PE, ep. 45, 141. 
17 PE, ep. 22, 77. ‘Neque vos quicquam deterreat quod vir ille idiota fuerit et illiteratus, horridae rupis et 
vastae solitudinis assiduus accola; nam et creditur quadam superna infusione dignatus, qua sapientes huius 
saeculi longe pracelleret’.  
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sophisticated.18  
 Lull was attractive to Lefèvre and students like Beatus because with his critique of 
unhealthy university culture he offered its solution: a combinatory ‘art’ that promised 
universal truth by means of necessary reasons.19 In the Contemplationes, he applied that art to 
the discovery or ‘invention’ of God’s excellent characteristics among his creatures, 
proceeding from God’s own character and his knowledge of all things in quantity and 
number.20 De nichilo, God created the firmament, elements, vegetation, sensitive animals, 
and humans with imaginative, rational, and intellectual powers. Lull’s analysis of man’s 
nature carries the reader to reflections on Christ’s incarnation, death, and future glory. 
 In Paris, alongside Lull, Beatus read the natural theology of Ramond de Sebonde, a 
medical professor at Montpellier during the 1430s who shared Lull’s commitment to 
necessary arguments based on naïve experience of nature.21 In fact, Beatus bound Sebonde’s 
book, originally titled ‘book of nature or creatures,’  with his copy of Lull’s Contemplationes. 
In the prologue Sebonde proclaimed that his science would ‘teach any man to know all 
necessary truth really, infallibly, easily, and effortlessly’.22 This mode of reading the book of 
nature supplied immediate knowledge in part because it required no complicated education: 
                                                 
18 Ibid., where Lefèvre quotes 2 Tim. 4:3-4. 
19 On the Lullian art, see F. A. Yates, ‘The Art of Ramon Lull: An Approach to It Through Lull’s Theory of the 
Elements’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 17, no. 1/2 (1954): 115–173; C. H. Lohr, 
‘Mathematics and the Divine: Ramon Lull’, in Mathematics and the Divine: A Historical Study, ed. T. 
Koetsier and L. Bergmans (Amsterdam/Boston: Elsevier, 2005), 211–229; Rossi, Logic and the Art of 
Memory, passim.  
20 R. Llull, Contenta. Primum volumen Contemplationum Remundi duos libros continens. Libellus Blaquerne 
de amico et amato, ed. Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples (Paris: Guy Marchant for Jean Petit, 1505). For the 
repeated use of ‘inventio’ as the basic activity of the art, see fol. 2v. The section on ‘qualiter deus scit 
quantitatem et numerum omnium rerum’ is at fols. 17v-18v. See also Rossi, Logic and the Art of Memory, 
46.  
21 R. Sabundus, Theologia naturalis sive liber creaturarum (Nuremberg: Anton Koberger, 1502).  ‘Liber 
naturae, sive creaturarum’ was the original title; theologia naturalis appears to be the addition of the first 
printer. 
22 Sabundus, Theologia Naturalis; Sive, Liber Creaturarum, ed. Friedrich Stegmüller (Stuttgart-Bad: Verlag, 
1966), 27*.  ‘ista scientia docet omnem hominem cognoscere realiter, infallibiter, sine difficultate et labore 
omnem veritatem necessariam..’.  
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‘this science needs no other science or art, for it does not presuppose grammar, logic, or any 
other of the seven liberal arts, nor physics, metaphysics: because [this science] is first and 
necessary to man’.23 The immediate power of the art lay in ‘true experience’ (vera 
experientia), and in the next 330 chapters Sebonde categorized nature as Lull had done. 
Experience not only accounted for the range of creatures, but taught that they all ‘serve man 
and exist for his good’24 – critics of natural theology from Montaigne to Voltaire would find 
this inference unconvincing. There are not enough notes in the book to isolate Beatus’ view 
on the issue, but since Lull’s name appears regularly in Beatus’ notes, it is clear that Beatus 
and his Parisian colleagues were fascinated by the general program found in Sebond’s 
Theologia naturalis, of reading the book of nature to gain naïve wisdom.  
 In the Fabrist circle, the third authority of naïve knowing was Nicholas of Cusa, 
whose name emerges in Rhenanus’ class notes as the model sapiens, alongside Pythagoras 
himself. In 1501 Lefèvre had already set Cusanus alongside Pythagoras and Dionysius as 
teachers of ‘intellectual’ philosophy, who used reasoning about opposites to move beyond the 
mere ‘sensible’ and ‘rational’ philosophy of Aristotle.25 Cusanus fit comfortably alongside 
Lull and Raymond de Sebonde; already in 1428 Cusanus had been in Paris to copy Lull’s 
manuscripts from the same Parisian monasteries that Lefèvre frequented.26 As with Lull, 
Beatus had some role in shaping the sixteenth-century reception of Cusanus, for in his edition 
of the Cusan Opera omnia (1514), Lefèvre thanked Beatus along with luminaries such as 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 30*–31*. ‘Ista scientia nulla alia indiget scientia nec aliqua arte. Non enim praesupponit grammaticam 
nec logicam nec aliquam de septem liberalibus artibus, nec physicam, nec metaphysicam, quia ista est 
prima, et est homini necessaria’. As Emmanuel Faye points out, Sebonde goes on to say that the liber 
naturae is open to all sorts of people, ‘est communis clericis et laecis, et omni conditioni hominum’. 
24 Ibid., Titulus 97, 122. ‘Hic declaratur experimentaliter, quod omnia serviunt homini, et sunt ad bonum 
hominis’. Famously, Montaigne responded to Lull with something akin to fideism;  Voltaire lampooned the 
Lullian tradition of natural theology (vis-à-vis Leibniz) in the figure of Pangloss, in his Candide. 
25 C. de Bovelles, In artem oppositorum introductio (Paris: Wolfgang Hopyl, 1501), sig. a1r.  
26 K. Reinhardt, ‘Die Lullus-Handschriften in der Bibliothek des Nikolaus von Kues. Ein Forschungsbericht’,  in Ramon 
Llull und Nikolaus von Kues. Eine Begegnung im Zeichen der Toleranz, edited by Ermenegildo Bidese et al. (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2005), 1-23. 
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Gregor Reisch and Johannes Reuchlin for helping him gather and correct manuscripts of 
Cusanus’ works. 
 Cusanus took up the Lullian theme of the unlearned knower ‘inventing’ truths from 
the book of nature in a three-part work titled Idiota de mente, de sapientia, and de staticis 
experimentis. The source of wisdom in these dialogues is the idiota, an artisan lacking Latin. 
He meets an Orator in a Roman Forum, and urges the Orator to see how his education has 
haltered his intellect to the opinion of authority in books. He invites the Orator cultivate 
learned ignorance instead, by reading from ‘God’s books’, the ones that God ‘wrote with his 
finger’ and which are available in the streets and marketplaces. Intrigued, the Orator shows 
enough humility to draw out the conversation. In the Idiota de sapientia we learn that wisdom 
exists beyond the contradictions of normal words, in God’s creative art: ‘infinite wisdom is 
simplicity that enfolds all forms and the most adequate measure of all things; just as in the 
most perfect idea of the omnipotent Art, everything formable by the Art exists in the most 
simple form of the Art itself’.27 In fact, in the next dialogue, Cusanus reveals that the idiota is 
a spoon-maker. This artisan conjectures that mind (mens) is related to measuring 
(mensurare).28 In this context, this standard etymology emphasizes that the idiota gets his 
knowledge from things themselves. The art of making spoons is found to be better than 
linguistic games for understanding the soul or mind, because it provides ‘symbolic 
illustrations’ of God’s creative art, since ‘every finite art derives from the Infinite Art’.29 
Spoonmaking turns out to involve the creative measurement of a block of wood into 
                                                 
27 N. of Cusa, Haec Accurata recognitio trium voluminum, Operum clariss. P. Nicolai Cusae Card., ed. 
Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples (Paris: Badius Ascensius, 1514), fol. 77v. ‘sic infinita sapientia est simplicitas 
omnes formas complicans et omnium adaequatissima mensura, quasi in perfectissima omnipotentis artis 
idea, omne per artem formabile simplicissima forma ars ipsa existat’. 
28 Ibid., fol. 81v. ‘mentem quidem a mensurando dici coniicio’. Translations, with modifications, from J. 
Hopkins, ed., Nicholas of Cusa’s Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises (Minneapolis, MN: 
Banning Press, 2001), 535–536. In this second dialogue, the orator is replaced by a philosopher. 
29 Cusanus, Opera, fol. 82r; Hopkins, Cusa’s Complete Treatises, 538. ‘Symbolica paradigmata’. ‘IDIOTA. 
Omnis ergo ars finita ab arte infinita […]’.  
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proportions that mirror the artisan’s mental exemplar. The artisan takes pains to display 
human making as the creative measurement of proportions, a theme taken up in the third 
dialogue, Idiota de staticis experimentis, in studies of moving objects, from the heavens to 
the power of magnets. By virtue of being an artisan, the idiota emerges as a special authority 
in measuring and governing rough material, since by performing such activities in daily life 
he more deeply understands the basis of the Divine Artisan’s creation in number, weight, and 
measure. 
 Throughout the dialogues, Cusanus made the idiota the source of the correct 
categories with which to speak about the world. By means of a dialogue between an idiota 
(illiterate in Latin) and an Orator or Philosopher, Cusanus clarified the proper role for learned 
inventio. The Orator reformulates the idiota’s distinctions and relations into learned speech, 
sometimes by supplying the relevant word, regularly restating the idiota’s point in the words 
of Plato, Hermes Trismegistus, or Vitruvius.30 Arriving at these categories is the process of 
invention, in two senses. This Roman Orator, skilled in the art of rhetoric, would have known 
that Cicero defined inventio as finding material to speak about. Moreover, since he was 
Cusanus’ creation, this Roman would have known Aristotle’s Topica, where Aristotle 
discussed invention as a method for proposing material for argument. Yet throughout these 
dialogues it is the idiota who finds or invents the material written in the book of things, even 
when the Orator recognizes the topics or places noted in texts.  
 In picturing the idiota as the best reader or inventor rerum of the book of nature, 
Cusanus expanded a topos growing in importance in late medieval Christianity: that the eyes 
of simple faith can see farther than eyes dimmed by books. The issue was real among critics 
of the academic status quo. Henry of Langenstein, who left Paris to help found the new 
                                                 
30 Cusanus, Opera, fols, 81r, 83r, 83v, 84r, 86r, 91v, 92r, et alia. 
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university of Vienna in the early 1380s, turned away from Aristotelian syllogistic to permit 
theological reasoning its own rules.31 Similarly, the Paris university chancellor Jean Gerson 
launched a series of sermons and tracts to unroot ‘moderni’; in the place of academic 
quarreling over words, he encouraged a posture of faith in mystical treatises such as De 
consolatione theologiae that quickly became best-selling classics.32 Clerical orders were not 
the only devotional ideal; the late medieval holy man or woman possessed of penetrating 
insight was just as likely to be a layperson.33 These trends nourished a growing vernacular 
religious literature that was meant, as John Van Engen says, ‘for private religious women like 
Sisters of the Common Life or recluses, as well as for lay brothers attached to religious 
houses’.34 Cusanus’ Europe was a religious world of ‘multiple options’, in which the holy 
fool had a growing authority and audience. 
 Yet even in offering the idiota as authority,  Cusanus was not turning his back on the 
liberal arts, especially not the mathematical ones. Rather, such learning translates experience. 
Like Lull and even Sebonde, Cusanus should be read as part of an intellectual tradition of 
mysticism, that seeks God through the movements and vision of the intellect rather than in 
the affections.35 Like Lull, he was fascinated by mathematics as a kind of intellectual vision 
that could inform philosophical and theological method. The theme of ‘man as the measure of 
                                                 
31 M. H. Shank, ‘Unless You Believe, You Shall Not Understand’: Logic, University, and Society in Late Vienna 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).  
32 D. B. Hobbins, ‘Gerson on Lay Devotion’, in A Companion to Jean Gerson, ed. B.P. McGuire (Leiden: 
Brill, 2006), 41–78. On Gerson’s success at shifting the academic culture from ‘nominalism’ to ‘realism’ of 
Albert the Great, see Z. Kaluza, Les querelles doctrinales à Paris: Nominalistes et realistes aux confins du 
XIVe et du XVe siècles (Bergamo: Lierluigi Lubrina, 1988).   
33 The lay origins and investment in the cults of the saints has become a commonplace, thanks to A. Vauchez, 
Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages, trans. J. Birrell (1981; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
See also perceptive comments by R. Kieckhefer, Unquiet Souls: Fourteenth-Century Saints and Their 
Religious Milieu (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 87–88.  
34 J. Van Engen, ‘Multiple Options: The World of the Fifteenth-Century Church’, Church History 77, no. 2 
(2008): 277.  
35 For a typology of these traditions, see K. Emery Jr., ‘Benet of Canfield: Counter-Reformation Spirituality 
and Its Medieval Origins’ (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1975), 147–248. Cusanus chose 
intellect over affections quite deliberately, in a debate with Johann Wenck, recounted in B. McGinn, The 
Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (New York: Crossroad, 2006), 445–456. 
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things’, knowledge as an approximation of the mind to the object of knowledge, is found 
throughout Cusanus. The Cusan linguistics of mental movements that modeled creation (and 
so, indirectly, the Creator) was succinctly captured by Lefèvre in his defense of theoretical 
astronomy:  
Just as the wisest, best craftsman [opifex] of things produces the true heavens and the true 
motions from the workmanship of the divine mind, so our mind always imitates him our 
parent (when the blemish of ignorance is wiped away), and produces in itself made-up 
[effictos] heavens and made-up motions, as certain simulacra of the true motions, in which 
it apprehends truth as in traces of the maker’s divine mind. Therefore, the astronomer’s 
mind, when it diligently makes up the heavens and their motions, is like the maker of 
things, the creator of the heavens and their movements … For who doubts that a kinship to 
to immortal nature arises from this?36 
For Lefèvre, as for Cusanus, a fundamental similarity between mind and world permitted one 
to reason from one to the other, to assume that mental categories fit the world. But was this 
an innate mental capacity, or was it taught? 
2. Mathematics in the Untutored Mind 
In practice, the ideal of learned ignorance fostered simpler ways to get at knowledge. In 
collecting his library, Beatus displayed one of the central motivations of an ambitious student: 
to know everything, quickly. He bought a popular treatise by Matteo da Perugia on rules and 
medical aids for helping one’s memory, including Aristotle and Cicero’s advice to associate 
                                                 
36 Lefèvre d’Étaples, Clichtove, and Bovelles, Epitome compendiosaque introductio in libros arithmeticos divi 
Severini Boetii, adiecto familiari [Clichtovei] commentario dilucidata. Praxis numerandi certis quibusdam 
regulis (auctore Clichtoveo). Introductio in geometriam Caroli Bovilli. Astronomicon Stapulensis. (Paris: 
Wolfgang Hopyl and Henri Étienne, 1503). “Et haud secus quam rerum sapientissimus optimusque opifex 
veros caelos et veros motus divinae mentis opificio producit, mens nostra sui semper aemula parentis (cum 
ignorantiae labes pluscum detergitur) effictos caelos effictosque motus intra se profert, verorumque motuum 
simulacra quadam, in quibus ut in vestigiis divinae mentis opificii deprehendit veritatem. Est igitur 
astronomi mens, cum caelos caelorumque motus gnaviter effingit, similis rerum opifici caelos caelorumque 
motus creanti … Id enim quis dubitat ex immortalis naturae cognatione illi obtingere?” 
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ideas with physical ‘places’, and to eat ginger and rhubarb.37 Besides such practical tips, 
Beatus read highly schematic summaries of the liberal arts such as Giovanni Foeniseca’s 
Quadratum sapientiae, which handily listed desirable bits of erudition such as the Hebrew 
alphabet, the names of musical proportions, and rules for determining commensurate angles. 
Diagrams and colored foldout charts detailed the universe’s creation and composition.38 Such 
small volumes promised shortcuts to the secrets of the universe, while delivering 
pharmaceutical and visual aids for recovering one’s mental stock – that is, for the practice of 
invention. 
 Beatus’ teachers wrote new textbooks in part designed to meet such hunger for 
immediate and universal knowledge. The core of their books were short introductions and 
paraphrases meant to provide elementary starting points of disciplines; Lefèvre’s amanuensis 
and traveling companion Guillaume Gontier, one of the several students who corrected 
Lefèvre’s very popular Introductio in suppositiones, defended its shocking brevity: ‘No one 
should condemn its brevity, for a preliminary art should be brief … because the intellect 
rejoices in brevity’. He described Lefèvre’s texts as a methodus, for ‘by this extremely brief 
method you are called to the studious gates of the disciplines, as if aided by a blowing wind 
and rowing oarsmen’.39 At the Cardinal Lemoine, mathematics was the model art for such 
immediate apprehension of universal knowledge, as I shall argue in the next section. 
                                                 
37 M. Perusinus, Tractatus de memoriae augenda per regulas et medicinas (Strassburg: M. Schott, 1495), sig. 
5r. BHS K 981d. ‘Unde utile est locum considerare in quo dicta ut facta sunt illa, quorum volumus 
reminisci. Unde Cicero pro memoria artificiali habenda docet stabiliri quedam loca, et illis cogitatis facile 
venimus in oblitum’. 
38 J. Foeniseca, Opera Ioannis Foenisecae Augn: haec in se habent. Quadratum sapientiae: continens in se 
septem artes liberales veterum. Circulos bibliae iiii. in quibus metaphysica mosaica. Commentaria horum 
(Miller et Foeniseca, 1515). BHS K 825m. 
39 J. Lefèvre d’Étaples, Introductiones logicales in suppositiones, in predicabilia, in divisiones, in 
predicamenta, in librum de enunciatione, in primum priorum, in secundum priorum, in libros posteriorum, 
in locos dialecticos, in fallacias, in obligationes, in insolubilia (Paris: Guy Marchant, 1496), sig. d6v. 
‘Nemo item brevitatem damnet, nam quicquid ars praecipit breve esse debet … adde quod intellectus 
brevitate gaudet …. ita quoque et vobis iter philosophiae ingressis summopere gratum esse debet, hac 
methodo etiam quam brevissima ad disciplinarum portus ocissime appelere, quasi aura flante secunda et 
quasi transtris remigibusque iuti’. 
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 In Gontier’s account, a method supplies the basic elements of an art, the material that 
can be then arranged, combined, and reorganized to produce new knowledge. Invention 
accounts for the parts that make up an art. Certainly, this was a historical process, as 
developed in Polydore Vergil’s De inventione rerum (1499). But in Lefèvre’s circle the 
invention of the arts also was about the discovery of nature. In a handbook summarizing all 
the arts and sciences, Bovelles described their ‘inventio’, beginning with the liberal arts of 
words and things (sermocinalia, grammar, etc.; realia, mathematics), and including the 
mechanical arts such as architecture and agriculture. Bovelles began his account of scientia 
with sight, the most important bodily sense: ‘sight is a material sense for finding (inventionis) 
the property of things and therefore of real sciences (realia), which determine the properties 
of things’. He added that “through words, learning occurs of everything that was first seen or 
heard by inventors’.40 With this statement, Bovelles took his position in the longstanding 
philosophical debate that humanist concerns over speech had given new life: knowledge is 
ultimately about the things to which words refer, not words alone. Bovelles made the point 
even clearer in the chapters devoted to the inventio of each art, in which he presented each 
domain’s ‘principles’ as based on discovery. Even the bookish study of the liberal arts is 
based on some original experience, thought now mediated by words. 
 Beatus Rhenanus’ notes on the logic course at Cardinal Lemoine display how 
mathematics exemplified knowledge of the world’s deep structures that is both true and 
naïve. First, the truth of such knowledge was guaranteed by psychological immediacy. On an 
endpaper to his logic textbook, Lefèvre’s Libri logicorum (1503), Beatus drew six circles, 
                                                 
40 Bovelles, Libellus de constitutione et utilitate artium humanorum, in quo et applicatio sermocinarlium ad 
rerum disciplinas atque imprimis Dyalctice edocetur (Paris: Jean Petit, 1500), fol. 4v–5r. ‘Visus est 
materialis sensus inventionis proprietatum rerum atque ideo et scientiarum realium, que rerum proprietates 
determinant … Idem quoque et realium et sermocinalium eruditionis sensus est. Enimvero sub vocibus, 
eruditio fit omnis inventorum prius aut visu aut auditu’. 
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representing the several domains of knowledge (Figure 1). The top three circles represent the 
‘greater world’ of the universe, from smallest to largest, including the sensible region of 
individuals, the heavenly region of species, and the spiritual region of genera. The lower three 
circles of the ‘lesser world’, the microcosmic human soul, depict the symmetry of knowledge 
within as a similitudo of the macrocosm. Most remarkably, the circles all meet at one point. 
This infinitesimally disappearing point of contact between circles – the senses – where the 
human mind meets the sensible, celestial, and spiritual worlds without. 
[insert figure 1 here] 
Figure 1. Beatus’ copy of Lefèvre, Libri logicorum (Paris: H. Estienne, 1503) (BHS K 1047), 
front endpaper, verso. 
 
Generally, this cognitive scheme encapsulated the standard Aristotelian account of the outer 
and inner senses, in which sense impressions from the outer senses are stored in the inner 
sense of memory, recombined by the imagination, and analyzed by the common sense.41 Late 
medieval natural philosophers argued intensely over the particular status of mental images, 
and whether it is possible to have any knowledge without images.42 Specifically, these circles 
mark the influence of Charles de Bovelles, who began his Liber de sensibus (published with 
several other works in 1510) with the distinction of inner and outer senses, as the respective 
                                                 
41 The doctrine of internal senses was most influentially stated by Albert the Great, based on Avicenna. For 
more detail, see K. Park, ‘The Organic Soul’, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. C. 
B. Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 464–484. Lefèvre gave his own version 
of this psychology in his Totius philosophae naturalis paraphrases (Paris: J. Higman, 1492), sig. D2v-D6r. 
42 For an orientation to these debates, see K. Park, ‘Albert’s Influence on Late Medieval Psychology’, in 
Albertus Magnus and the Natural Sciences, ed. J. A. Weisheipl (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1980), 501–535; K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, 
and the Foundations of Semantics, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 22 (Leiden: E. 
J. Brill, 1988); L. Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge, Vol. I: Classical Roots and 
Medieval Discussions (Leiden: Brill, 1994).  
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domains of the mundus maior and minor.43 In this work, Bovelles explained that the exterior 
senses are the union (copula) of the major and minor worlds, by which the species of all 
things penetrate within, to the interior senses.44 Bovelles then elaborated a hierarchy of the 
senses from the material senses (touch, imagination), to the immaterial senses of vision 
(angelic intellect) and hearing (divine mind).45 While Beatus’ circles do not precisely 
reproduce this hierarchy, these circles do show that either Bovelles was one of Beatus’ logic 
teachers, or Bovelles’ innovative account of the senses was shared among the Fabrists already 
in 1503. This cognitive structure justifies the assumption that the human mind – just because 
human – reflects the real world. 
 The hierarchy of the mind then orders the academic disciplines, so that those closest 
to the mind (and so nature) are the most trustworthy. Beatus diagrammed this cognitive 
scheme in a logic textbook because logic was meant to start, in Lefèvre’s circle, with the 
categories of knowledge immediately available to the mind. Lefèvre’s Libri logicorum was 
published in two stages in 1501 and 1503. As Cesare Vasoli noted, Lefèvre offered the 
traditional texts. The first part of the volume included Porphyry on the predicamenta, 
Aristotle’s Categoriae, and Boethius’ commentaries on them.46 Lefèvre added a substantial 
apparatus for these books – introductions, paraphrases, and commentaries – arguing that these 
disciplines for discovering categories were the most certain part of ratiocination, properly 
called logic. The second part of the volume dealt with dialectic, namely Aristotle’s Priora and 
                                                 
43 Liber de sensibus in Bovelles, Liber de intellectu; Liber de sensu; Liber de nichilo; Ars oppositorum; Liber 
de generatione; Liber de sapiente; Liber de duodecim numeris; Epistole complures. Insuper mathematicum 
opus quadripartitum: De numeris perfectis; De mathematicis rosis; De geometricis corporibus; De 
geometricis supplementis (Paris: H. Estienne, 1511), 22r et seq..   
44 Ibid., 22v. 
45 On this hierarchy, see T. Frangenberg, ‘“Auditus Visu Prestantior”: Comparisons of Hearing and Vision in 
Charles de Bovelles’s “Liber de sensibus”’, in The Second Sense. Studies in Hearing and Musical 
Judgement from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, ed. C. Burnett, M. Fend, and P. Gouk, Warburg 
Institute Surveys and Texts 22 (London: The Warburg Institute, 1991), 71-94.    
46 Vasoli, La dialettica e la retorica, 206–209.  
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Posteriora analytica, which addressed arguments of merely probable reasoning. After these 
two parts, Lefèvre added a third, and to all appearances he did so for the sake of 
completeness more than out of conviction of its intrinsic value: this third part was actually 
printed two years after the first two parts, and simply comprised a sparsely annotated 
translation of Aristotle’s Topica and the Sophisticis elenchis, texts that Lefèvre associated 
with oratory and debate for its own sake – rhetorical inventio for sophistic causes.47 Being 
further from immediate experience of the world, such oratorical topics were less trustworthy. 
Beatus’ densest notes are on the predicaments and Aristotle’s Categoria, reflecting Lefèvre’s 
emphasis on the first (and more traditional) part of the logic curriculum. 
 How Beatus annotated his copy of the Libri logicorum illustrates his teachers’ view of 
logic as a matter of words and things, and particularly Lefèvre’s focus on mathematical 
objects. Aristotle himself was ambiguous about whether the categories were about the words 
(such as individuals, species, or genus) conventionally applied to things, or in fact reflected 
things in themselves – precisely why medieval schools could fight bitterly over the issue.48 
Vasoli, following Renaudet’s excerpt of a phrase from Beatus’ cahier d’étudiant (BHS MS 
58) concerning the views of the nominalists as ‘vera et pulchra’, has suggested that Lefèvre 
and his circle were friendly to conventionalist accounts of language.49 A closer examination 
of Beatus’ notes themselves, however, reveals a different account.  
 Beatus reprised his diagram of circles in the section on Aristotle’s category of 
quantity. Aristotle famously prioritized qualities over quantity, making quantity merely a 
                                                 
47 Lefèvre described this third section on its separate titlepage (1503), as about invention. 
48 My object here is not to comment on the vexed distinction between nominalists and realists in the fifteenth 
century (which often makes assumptions based on fourteenth-century polemical stances). Practically, I take 
the categories still to be useful, following M. J. F. M. Hoenen, ‘Via Antiqua and Via Moderna in the 
Fifteenth Century: Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the Wegestreit’, in The Medieval 
Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700, edited by R. L. Friedman and L. O. 
Nielsen ( Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 9–36. 
49 Renaudet, Préréforme et humanisme, 131, 473. Vasoli quoted this at La dialettica e la retorica, 187.  
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product of the process of abstraction; for him, mathematical objects did not exist ‘out there’.50 
The diagram Beatus drew in the margin suggests a more complicated view of numbers 
(Figure 2). 
[include figure 2 here] 
Figure 2. Beatus’ copy of Lefèvre, Libri logicorum (BHS K 1047), fol. 27r. 
 
Here the three circles again reflect the microcosm man (homo), with rational soul (rationalis 
anima) and mind (mens) within. The bottom of the diagram is open, expanded to include the 
series of discrete numbers 1 through 5, each existing in its own bubble in a realm labeled 
‘numeri formales numerantes’. Each of these, moreover, projects its own aggregated unities 
onto the world, the numeri materiales numerati. Immediately below, Beatus listed three kinds 
of number-objects: numerantia, numerata, and numeri. Lefèvre’s commentary helps make 
sense of the diagram. In the text beside the diagram, he claimed that among the animals only 
man can count, a demonstration of the uniqueness of the human soul. Moreover, numbers are 
of three kinds: ‘there are counting numbers, counted numbers, and numbers in themselves. 
Counting numbers are souls applying their own numbers to things; counted numbers are 
those things to which the soul correctly and appropriately applies numbers; numbers [i.e. in 
themselves] are those discrete reasons of counting’.51 This three-fold distinction is 
particularly important, because Lefèvre explained that the soul applies numbers in a special 
way – as an instrument – to things in the world, in a way that matches or harmonizes the 
number in the world with the number in the mind. He used the example of a forearm or 
                                                 
50 Aristotle, De anima, 3.7, 431b12-16; Physica, 2, 193b22-35, 194a4-7; Metaphysica, 6.1, 1026a13-17, 11.7, 
1064a31-35; 13.2, 1076b12-13, 1076b40-1077a19, 1077a31-b18. 
51 BHS K 1047, 27r. ‘Unde sunt numerantia, sunt numerata, sunt numeri. Numerantia sunt anime numeros 
suos rebus applicantis. Numerata sunt ea quibus anima numeros apte accommodeque applicat. Numeri sunt 
discrete ille rationes numerandi’. 
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thumb used to measure out a length of cloth. The quantity of cloth was already there, just as 
the number was already in the mind; but there was a necessary extension, through the arm, of 
the mental number to the cloth in order to know the cloth’s quantity. The thrust of Lefèvre’s 
account, instead of focusing on Aristotle’s arguments against the real existence of quantity in 
the world, drew on Boethius’ more realist account of numbers.52 As the next section shows, it 
was significant that Lefèvre centered on instruments of measurement for aligning one’s mind 
with the world. 
 Second, Lefèvre’s account of mathematical knowing depended on naïve or untutored 
knowledge. One need not be learned to measure, a point Beatus and Lefèvre conceded with 
such examples from the marketplace. The idea that rational principles, the basic structures of 
reasoning, already exist in the untutored mind is related to Lefèvre’s argument that counting 
is basic and therefore common to human nature.  
 Lefèvre expanded on this point in his opening commentary on the Posteriora 
analytica, the fundamental text for Aristotelian accounts of ‘scientific’ method.53  In 
the first chapter of the Posteriora analytica, Aristotle considered how knowledge proceeds 
from previous knowledge. Aristotle’s goal was to describe in what sense the conclusion of a 
syllogism provides more knowledge than its premisses, rather than to offer a Platonic account 
of recollection, though he alerted readers to the dilemma of Plato’s Meno, in which a slave 
boy’s untutored knowledge of geometry demonstrates that learning is either illusory or only 
                                                 
52 In fact, Lefèvre never produced an introduction to last part of the Metaphysica, where Aristotle’s chiefly 
argued for his abstractionist account of numbers; he only ever addressed the first six books: J. Lefèvre 
d’Étaples, Introductio in metaphysicorum libros Aristotelis, ed. Josse Clichtove (Paris: J. Higman, 1493). 
Such a distinction of numbers can be traced to Boethius, De trinitate 3.10-22; the notion of formal numbers 
was also important for Pico: J.-M. Mandosio, ‘Beyond Pico Della Mirandola: John Dee’s ‘‘Formal 
Numbers’’ and ‘‘Real Cabala’’’, in John Dee and the Sciences: Networks of Knowledge, ed. J. M. Rampling, 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 2012.  
53 See, for example, N. Jardine, ‘Epistemology of the Sciences’, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance 
Philosophy, ed. C. B. Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 685–711.  
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recollection what one already knows.54 To avoid the dilemma, Aristotle offered the syllogism 
as a way to infer from known instances to universal statements. In Lefèvre’s Latin edition, 
Aristotle described three ways that syllogisms depend on prior knowledge: 
All teaching and all intellectual learning comes from preexisting knowledge. This is 
evident to those looking into everything, for mathematical science and the other arts work 
in this way. Likewise also concerning the speeches which operate through syllogisms and 
induction, for both made teaching out of something previously known … Rhetoricians also 
persuade in the same way, either by examples, which is induction, or by enthymemes, 
which is a sort of syllogism.55 
Lefèvre divided Aristotle’s three kinds of knowledge into the fundamental liberal arts, 
followed by dialectic and rhetoric. He lumped together mathematics and the liberal arts, as 
those that teach by ‘their own, certain reasoning’. Dialectic, in contrast, works with ‘common 
judgments’; while oratorical reasoning merely addresses ‘apparent truths’.56 The truths of 
mathematics and the liberal arts are not quite innate, but they are the next best thing: they are 
so certain that they can be learned without a teacher – such truths, as Beatus noted in the 
margin, are open to autodidacti, those who can teach themselves. The men of such ‘better 
nature and powerful wit’ (melioris naturae et genii viros) that Lefèvre lists is telling: Mercury 
Trismegistus, Euclid, Aristotle, Nicholas of Cusa, and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. (In 
fact, the very word autodidactus may mark Pico’s influence.57) 
                                                 
54 Meno 80e.  
55 J. Lefèvre d’Étaples, Libri logicorum (Paris: Hopyl & Stephanus, 1503), fol. 177v. ‘Omnis doctrina et 
omnis disciplina intellectiva ex preexistente fit cognitione. Manifestum autem hoc speculantibus in omnibus 
mathematice enim scientie per hunc modum fiunt, et aliarum unaqueque artium. Similiter autem et circa 
orationes que per syllogismos et que per inductionem, utreque enim per prius nota faciunt doctrinam . . . 
similiter autem et rhetorice persuadent, aut enim per exempla quod est inductio, aut per enthymemata quod 
quidem est syllogismus’. 
56 Ibid. ‘enim mathematice scientie et alie liberales artes propriis certisque ratiociniis instituunt; dialectice, 
communibus disceptationibus; oratorie autem et rhetorice, verisimilibus’. 
57 See A. Ben-Zaken, Reading Hayy Ibn-Yaqzan: A Cross-Cultural History of Autodidacticism (Baltimore, 
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 Thus Lefèvre made geometry the example of systematic thought, following Aristotle’s 
rare championing of mathematics in the Posteriora analytica: it is clear from mathematics 
how theorems flow from previous knowledge ‘sometimes from principles, at other times 
from those things that are understood from the principles’.58 But Lefèvre went further, using 
mathematics as the example for the other liberal arts and a foundation for the two other kinds 
of reasoning,  dialectical speech and oratory.59 The threefold account of the disciplines 
mirrors his threefold division of the logical organon, and his prioritization of mathematics 
matches his emphasis on the predicamenta. In the following pages Lefèvre offers a reading of 
Plato’s classic argument for knowledge as the recollection of innate ideas in the Meno, going 
far beyond Aristotle’s passing reference. Without granting that humans actually share innate 
knowledge, Lefèvre focuses on the shared capacity for immediate knowledge. He uses an 
analogy to vision, with the intellect as eye, axioms as the light – as Beatus clarifies, an 
intellectual principle is therefore ‘absolute light’ and like light is immediately available to the 
mind’s eye.60 There are therefore two kinds of propositions; those immediately available in 
themselves, and then propositions that can be inferred from them. Self-evident propositions 
(i.e. axioms) are the ‘proloquia’ for each discipline.  
 Reflections on the Meno and Neoplatonic light imagery in a commentary on 
Aristotle’s syllogistic is at first glance a long way from the idiota of Cusanus. But Cusanus’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), chap. 3. Ben-Zaken argues that Pico had found an 
autodidactic example in the twelfth-century Arabic tale Hayy Ibn-Yaqzan, about a boy who grew up alone 
on an island, prodigiously making philosophy out of his isolated experience of the world. Lefèvre could 
have encountered Pico’s account of autodidacticism in his Heptaplus or Disputationes adversus 
astrologicam divinatricem. 
58 Lefèvre d’Étaples, Libri logicorum, fol 178r. ‘in mathematicis scientiis ex antecedente cognitione scientiam 
nasci, nunc principiorum, nunc eorum que ex principio sunt cognita, quam manifestum est.  
59 The oratorical faculty ‘deals with civil affairs’ (oratoria facultas circa civilia versatur, ibid.). 
60 Ibid., ‘Verum quedam talia sunt, que cognitis terminis (attentione mentis adhibita) statim cognoscimus, 
perinde ac apertis fenestris, et revelatis ciliis. Statim lumen cognoscimus. Est intellectus oculus.’. It should 
be noted that Lefèvre uses Plato’s account in part to provide authority for innate knowledge, in part because 
he wants to support the immortality of the soul. At the end of this passage, referring to Augustine’s 
Retractationes, he warns readers off from incautiously reading Plato, notably for supposing the human soul 
to be uncreated. 
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artisan was a character from Roman antiquity who spouted lessons that the Orator then 
categorized according to the authority of Aristotle and Plato. The idiota might possess the 
deepest insight, but required learning to communicate that knowledge. The reading of the 
untutored mind in Lefèvre’s circle did not simply cast aside all learning to start over with 
Rousseau’s Émile. Instead, it was an effort to include naïve experience as an important 
starting point for a simplified, useful philosophy – with a division of labor that required a 
community, a society of both theorists and artisans. 
3. Thinking for Artisans 
Did Lefèvre, Cusanus, and Lull’s appreciation for the untutored mind lead to productive 
partnerships between artisans and theorists, the kind of ‘trading zones’ between domains of 
knowledge that Pamela Long has found among sixteenth-century artisan/practitioners?61 A 
detailed account is impossible here, but a sketch can reinforce arguments for overlap 
advanced by Isabelle Pantin, Pascal Brioist, and Alexander Marr. 
 Lefèvre’s own works were firmly within the liberal arts, but like many Renaissance 
pedagogues he trumpeted their practical utility: geometry for surveying, arithmetic for 
keeping accounts, and music for therapy.62 Some of this was boilerplate captationes 
benevolentiae; but at other times Lefèvre thought practical philosophy worth his time. In the 
early 1490s, Lefèvre wrote a De magia naturali, deploying Pico’s cabbala and Ficino’s 
Pythagorean arithmetic to expand on the ‘practical part of philosophy’ that could effect real 
                                                 
61 P. O. Long, Artisan/Practitioners and the Rise of the New Sciences, 1400-1600 (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State 
University Press, 2011). The term ‘trading zones’ comes from Peter Louis Galison, Image and Logic: A 
Material Culture of Microphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). The question, if not the 
term, has long history: L. Olschki, Geschichte der Neusprachlichen Wissenschaftlichen Literatur, 3 vols. 
(Leipzig: Leo S. Olschki, 1919).   
62 J. Lefèvre d’Étaples, Arithmetica elementa; Musica elementa; Epitome in libros arithmeticos divi Severini 
Boetii; Rithmimachie ludus que et pugna numerorum appellatur (Paris: Higman and Hopyl, 1496), sig. a1v 
(=PE, ep. 5, 18), sig. f1v (=PE ep 10, 32).  
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change in the natural world – even though he later denounced magical practices.63 Moreover, 
Lefèvre seems to have gone out of his way to learn from artisans. In his most original treatise 
on music theory, he thanked two music teachers. Their tutelage affected Lefèvre’s theoretical 
work too, as he apologized for breaking formal rules in music theory in order to 
accommodate certain elements of practice. The work’s crowning example was Lefèvre’s 
geometrical technique for dividing the interval into ‘irrational’ proportions – proportions of 
the sort musicians actually used to tune instruments.64 Elsewhere, Lefèvre recalled attending 
the lectures of the Italian architect and humanist Fra Giocondo, who had accompanied 
Charles VIII on his triumphal return to Paris in 1495, and who designed royal fountains and 
the replacement to the pont de Notre Dame that collapsed in 1499.65 (These same lectures 
also inspired the great Hellenist Guillaume Budé, who quoted Giocondo on the details of 
Italian and ancient Roman architecture and instruments.66) 
 Scholars and artisans found common space in the bustle of early print shops. When 
Lefèvre went for the second time to Italy in 1500, primarily for the papal Jubilee, he also 
visited Aldus Manutius’ print shop in Venice. There he met Muslims or ‘Hagarenes’ (gens 
Agarena) who were particularly good at physionomics, the art of judging inner character 
from one’s physical attributes. These men were exceptionally accomplished in this science 
                                                 
63 See J.-M. Mandosio’s chapter on the De magia naturali forthcoming in Les Muses secrètes: Kabbale, 
alchimie et littérature à la Renaissance (Geneva: Droz), graciously shared with me in manuscript. On 
Lefèvre’s turn from magic, see especially E. F. Rice, ‘The De magia naturali of Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples’, 
in Philosophy and Humanism: Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. E. P. Mahoney 
(Leiden: Brill, 1976), 19-29; J. R. Veenstra, ‘Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples: Humanism and Hermeticism in the 
De Magia Naturali’, in Christian Humanism: Essays in Honour of Arjo Vanderjagt, ed. A.J. Vanderjagt, 
A.A. MacDonald, and Z.R.W.M. von Martels (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 353–362.  
64 Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, Arithmetica elementa; Musica elementa; Epitome in libros arithmeticos divi 
Severini Boetii; Rithmimachie ludus que et pugna numerorum appellatur (Paris: Johannes Higman and 
Wolfgang Hopyl, 1496). On music theory and mathematics in the sixteenth century, see P. Pesic, ‘Hearing 
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because of their marketplace experience, since when buying and selling slaves they were 
keenly interested in those with a good nature.67 In Italy, possibly at Rome, Lefèvre picked up 
a small treatise on an ‘astronomical ring’ published there a few years earlier by the pope’s 
personal physician and astrologer Bonetus de Lattis.68 Immediately on arriving in Paris, he 
requested his student Charles de Bovelles to edit it for publication along with his own Textus 
de sphaera; later editions always included the Annulus astronomicus.69 
 This short account of a miniature astrolabe locates Lefèvre’s books between the 
worlds of the practitioner and the pedagogue. On the one hand, there is no indication that 
Lefèvre or Bovelles actually made the ring described in the treatise – in fact, they probably 
did not see the object until well after publishing its manual, when they met its maker Bonetus 
in Rome in 1507. If Bovelles accurately recounted the event, their discussion of the ring 
rapidly devolved into a debate over the Trinity.70 On the other hand, the ring shows the 
circle’s pedagogical use of objects (especially wonderful and imaginative ones) to encourage 
student understanding. Lefèvre’s own printed publications display what we might call the 
instrumentality of images, typography, and page layout, with a special attention to visual aids 
to serve memory, and the early use of innovative divisions such as paragraph indentation.71 
An example different from either diagrams or tables was Lefèvre’s image of a metalworker’s 
lathe, complete with semi-circular blade to help students visualize a sphere.72 Books, 
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especially pedagogical ones, were never merely containers for texts, but deployed visual tools 
to tutor students. 
 Charles de Bovelles is especially important because of his interest in the world of 
artisans and practical mathematics, and because he links Lefèvre’s circle with Oronce Fine, 
Paris’ preeminent mathematical practitioner of the sixteenth century. Bovelles systematically 
constructed his philosophy and mystical theology around mathematical and visual analogies, 
loosely inspired by Nicholas of Cusa. He possessed an enduring interest in geometry, and 
already in 1511 published the Geometrie en françoys, one of the first practical geometries in 
the French language.73 Bovelles later wrote an updated Géométrie practique, which Oronce 
Fine corrected and illustrated for its first printing in 1542; the book was revised and reprinted 
until 1608.74 
 Bovelles asked Fine to illustrate his Géométrie practique precisely out of respect for 
him as both scholar and artisan. Bovelles apparently met Fine in Noyon, but they also were 
connected through the Paris print shops that Lefèvre’s circle frequented, notably that of Henri 
Estienne. In fact, Fine’s first appearance in print was in 1515 as the illustrator of Reginald 
Chaudière’s editions of Thomas Bricot’s Meteorologia and a collection of astronomical 
treatises – Chaudière was Estienne’s son-in-law.75 In 1521, when Estienne died, Simon de 
Colines took over the press and hired Fine to design magnificent new titlepages and 
frontispieces for updated editions of Lefèvre’s Textus de sphaera, complete with Bonetus’ 
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Annulus astronomicus.76 In 1534, Fine appended Bovelles, Lefèvre, and Clichtove’s 
mathematical introductions to the first Paris edition of Gregor Reisch’s famous encyclopedia, 
the Margarita philosophica. By that year, Fine’s mathematical expertise had earned him the 
first royal professorship in mathematics.77 His expertise was as a practitioner as much as a 
theoretician. While it is not clear whether Fine himself traced and cut the woodblocks, or 
simply designed them, he was certainly known as someone who actually made instruments. 
His father had been a physician trained at Paris, who had made a model of the planetary 
motions ‘by his own hand and industry’.78 Morever, Fine’s student and friend Antoine 
Mizauld observed that royalty, clergy, and nobility frequented Fine’s home ‘to see what, by 
his own hand, he had painted, or sculpted, or described – I say not only maps or books, but 
also a thousand mathematical instruments, and devices of other sorts’.79 In a poem that Fine 
wrote when seeking the royal professorship, Epistre touchant la dignité, perfection, et utilité 
des sciences mathematiques, Fine emphasized the philosophical utility of the mathematical 
disciplines, but also detailed their practical importance to the ‘gens de pratique’ and the arts 
‘qui sont maneuls corporaux’.80 As testimony to Fine’s distinctive practical bent, the poem 
concludes with geography and perspective. 
 Like Lefèvre, Fine associated mathematics with naïve knowledge. As Angela 
Axworthy has shown, Fine framed mathematics as a ‘philosophy’ which was not only the 
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‘clefz de tout perfet sçavoir’, but also a ‘miroer de toute certitude’, and so a worthy 
propaedeutic to all other disciplines.81 It could be so because it required no previous training, 
yet was itself excellent training in the disposition and procedures of judgment required in all 
the other arts.  
 Fine advertised the cognitive simplicity of his instruments, as Lefèvre and his students 
did of their textbooks. In his Planetarum aequatorium, published in 1526 and 1538, Fine 
presented his own version of the medieval instrument that calculated the positions of planets 
against the zodiac, along with rules of use – all of which were ‘very easy to understand and 
use’ (et intellectu et usu facillimum). His own version was better, he claimed, because it was 
simpler; rather than the many wheels of older instruments, his own required only two. Like 
Lefèvre before him, in his prefaces Fine advanced his own program of mathematics by 
contrasting its cognitive ‘purety’ with sophistic debates that put ‘certain frivolous fights over 
terms in place of the good arts.’82 Fine proposed the clarity and certainty of mathematics as a 
better tool than sophismata and other scholastic cavillationes for studying a world God had 
created, after all, by means of number.83 Fine drew on the skills of both pedagogue and artisan 
to propose that mathematics led to the most productive knowledge of nature – as Ramus 
would do in the following decades.84 
Conclusion 
While Lefèvre’s interests were not particularly novel in any one feature, his efforts to 
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harmonize Aristotle, Plato, and Christian doctrine resulted in an important configuration of 
erudition around the hunt for immediate, certain, and common knowledge of the world, and 
the conviction that such common knowledge could be modeled on mathematics. Beatus’ 
student notes sharpen the point, and raise the significance of the exemplarist psychology of 
Lull and Cusanus. In this way, I join Timothy Reiss in arguing that Lefèvre’s circle 
contributed in important ways to the sixteenth-century emphasis on mathematics for 
understanding the world.85  
 To this picture, I would add that the idiota was an important feature in Lefèvre’s 
circle, who linked late medieval hunger for the experience of God and objects on the one 
hand86, with the rising interest in experience of nature on the other.87 Cusanus’ writings found 
their way into the library of John Dee, who found authority for the term ‘Experimentall 
Science’ in the idiota dialogues de staticis experimentis: ‘Nicolaus Cusanus termeth it so, in 
hys Experimentes Statikall.’88 Nagel noted that these dialogues were the explicit source for 
Dee’s conviction that mathematics should be the instrument for probing nature’s secrets.89 
This could be true in a more general sense; Cusanus’ attitude fed a growing desire to simplify 
reasoning, to emphasize ‘naïve invention’ in ‘method’. This was not simply about trying to 
get away without thinking, as Charles Schmitt implied in his influential note on the rise of the 
philosophical textbook, and as Ong accused Ramus.90 Put another way, the trope of the idiota 
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and the push toward immediate knowledge was as much an attempt to naturalize intellection 
as it was anti-intellectual. 
 I should qualify my argument by noting that I do not mean to suggest that the idiota 
was the only paradigm for knowledge, or even the most important. Cusanus, Lefèvre, and to a 
lesser extent Ramus himself fit the standard mold of the old, pious, and impossibly erudite 
sage, a model of wisdom that perdured the Renaissance.91 Nevertheless, the example of 
untutored knowledge offered by the mystic or the artisan supported a growing paradigm, 
from Baconian natural history to Rousseau’s bon sens, for direct access to nature. 
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